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I. Introduction
The primary goal of the National Environmental Policy Act of 19691
(“NEPA”) is to ensure that agencies consider the environmental impacts of 
their actions before engaging in them.  NEPA forces agencies to evaluate 
reasonable alternatives to their proposed actions and design appropriate 
mitigation measures, leading to the implementation of such measures when 
necessary.  The intended result of the NEPA process is governmental 
decision-making that is well-informed, rather than hasty or arbitrary, with 
regard to impacts on environmental quality.  As such, NEPA applies broadly 
to agency decision-making.  However, by arguing that the public interest in 
national security outweighs environmental concerns, some agencies have 
been successful in thwarting NEPA’s purpose.  A recent example is found in 
* J.D., 2010, Albany Law School, Albany, New York.  The author would like
to thank Professor Raymond Brescia for working with her throughout the numerous 
drafts of this article, Professor Keith Hirokawa for his advice and constructive 
comments, and Vitaliy Volpov for his help and support. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
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Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 where the U.S. Navy 
circumvented NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) requirement 
and proceeded with its proposed action without regard for the NEPA 
process.   
Because NEPA noncompliance cases often include requests for 
injunctive relief, courts have a duty to weigh the public interest in national 
security against the public interest in the environment when deciding 
whether to grant relief.  However, courts have instead tended to defer to the 
agencies of the Executive Branch, and in doing so have created a national 
security exemption from NEPA.  The Legislature, though, purposefully 
excluded such an exemption from the statute.  To be sure, national security 
is important and should be given elevated attention when appropriate - 
such as when the delay required to prepare an EIS itself causes a threat - but 
it should not be used as a pretext for avoiding NEPA requirements.  NEPA’s 
requirements serve the important roles of effecting substantive changes in 
decision-making, informing the public, and creating a record which courts 
can review when determining challenges for noncompliance.  Courts must 
balance the competing harms in NEPA noncompliance cases because 
environmental concerns could outweigh national security concerns in a 
given case.  When injunctions are at issue, courts should closely examine 
agencies’ assertions that delays associated with NEPA compliance pose a 
threat to national security and strike down such assertions when used 
merely as attempts to avoid compliance with NEPA.   
Part II of this article begins by highlighting the purposes and goals of 
NEPA and arguing that the operation of NEPA is a vital component of our 
environmental policy.  Part III reviews some of the more notable 
controversies in which courts have deferred to the national security 
argument in NEPA noncompliance cases rather than engaging in the 
appropriate balancing required for the determination of injunctions.  It then 
looks at cases in which the courts have properly weighed the competing 
harms and reviews the proper roles of the three branches of government. 
This article concludes in Parts IV and V by examining the absence of a 
statutory national security exemption and the dangers that courts face when 
extending deference to the assertion of national security.   
II. The Purposes and Goals of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969
NEPA’s purpose is to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; . . . promote efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the 
health and welfare of man; . . . [and] enrich the understanding of the 
2. 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
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ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.”3  To 
implement these goals, NEPA requires that all federal agencies prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement on every “recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment . . . .”4  The EIS must include:  
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii)
alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the
relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.5
In deciding whether to prepare an EIS, an agency will first determine 
whether the action concerns a proposal for legislative action or a major 
federal action.6  If so, it will then determine whether the environmental 
impacts are significant.7  Under the regulations promulgated by the Council 
on Environmental Quality, when evaluating the significance of an action an 
agency must consider whether the proposal is one that normally requires an 
EIS.8  If there is not enough information to answer this question, the 
regulations require that the agency prepare an Environmental Assessment 
(“EA”) to aid in determining whether a full EIS is warranted.9  If the agency, 
after preparing an EA, decides that an EIS is not necessary, it will issue a 
Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) and the action may proceed.10  
Agencies typically memorialize the threshold decision in a Record of 
Decision (“ROD”), which can be challenged in court through the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).11 
If an EIS is prepared, a draft EIS is distributed and made available for 
public comment and the agency may not make a decision on the proposed 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).




8. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a) (1978).
9. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1978); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c) (1978).
10. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (1978); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1978).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1978).
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action until 90 days after notice of the draft EIS is published in the Federal 
Register.12  The agency must then respond to public comments and prepare 
a final EIS.13  Once a final EIS and ROD are issued, there is a 30-day 
moratorium on agency action to afford opponents of the decision an 
opportunity to file legal challenges.14  The EIS must be prepared before the 
agency engages in its proposed action so that the agency can use it in 
making its decision on whether or how to engage in its proposed activity. 
Congress emphasized this requirement, stating that “[t]he statement shall 
be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an important 
contribution to the decision-making process and will not be used to 
rationalize or justify decisions already made . . . .”15  The general remedy for a 
NEPA violation is a remand to the agency and a stay of the proposed action 
until the agency prepares and considers a satisfactory EIS.16  
Although NEPA is procedural in nature, it also plays an important role 
in protecting the environment.  While a court will not require a substantive 
change in an agency action due to an agency’s preparation of an EIS, the 
court will consider whether the process was properly followed and ensure 
that the agency has considered the consequences and alternatives to its 
actions.17  NEPA is a procedural statute in that “the only role for a court is to 
ensure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it 
cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the 
choice of the action to be taken.’”18  In essence, a court will only require that 
an agency inform itself of the environmental impacts of its proposed action; 
it will not tell the agency which action to take once it has informed itself.   
A court reviews an agency’s decision regarding the preparation of an 
EIS under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.  “The court must 
determine whether the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at the consequences 
of its actions, based its decision on a consideration of relevant factors, and 
provided a ‘convincing statement of reasons to explain why a project’s 
impacts are insignificant.’”19  The court will not substitute its own judgment 
12. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(b)(1) (1978).
13. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(c) (1978).
14. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(b)(2) (1978).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1978).
16. See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984).
17. See Ian K. London, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council: Enabling the
Military’s Ongoing Rollback of Environmental Legislation, 87 DENV. U.L. REV. 197, 208-09 
(2009).   
18. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980)
(quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976)). 
19. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir.1988)). 
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for that of the agency; it will defer to the agency’s decision not to prepare an 
EIS as long as the agency has taken a “hard look” at the consequences of its 
actions and explained why they are insignificant.  However, this does not 
mean that a court may defer to an agency’s decision not to comply with 
NEPA.  If an agency has not taken the requisite “hard look,” the court should 
not allow the action to continue until the agency has fully complied with 
NEPA.   
Although the statute is procedural, compliance with NEPA is 
important for the preservation of our environment as “[NEPA] is more than 
an environmental full-disclosure law.”20  Rather, “NEPA was intended to 
effect substantive changes in decision-making.”21  Although the courts will 
not require a substantive result, inherent in NEPA’s purpose is the goal that 
an agency will nevertheless learn from the EIS process and implement 
alternatives or mitigation measures to reduce the impact that its actions will 
have on the environment.22   
When an agency fails to draft an EIS without taking the requisite “hard 
look,” or drafts an EIS after engaging in the proposed action, this underlying 
purpose cannot be fulfilled.  An agency cannot take alternative action or 
implement mitigation measures if it does not first perform a study to 
discover these options.  Hence, the NEPA regulations provide that “[a]n 
agency shall commence preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement 
as close as possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented 
with a proposal.”23  The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the EIS 
“can serve practically as an important contribution to the decision-making 
process,”24 rather than allowing the agency “to rationalize or justify decisions 
20. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of U. S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th
Cir. 1972). 
21. Id.
22. For further support for the argument that NEPA, although procedural, was
intended to effect substantive results, see London, supra note 17; Christopher 
Kendall, Dangerous Waters? The Future of Irreparable Harm under NEPA after Winter v. 
NRDC, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109, 11111 (2009); Caroline Milne, Winter 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council: The United States Supreme Court Tips the Balance against
Environmental Interests in the Name of National Security, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 200 (2009);
Susannah T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CALIF.
L. REV. 929, 946-47 (1993); Timothy Patrick Brady, ‘But Most of it Belongs to Those Yet to Be
Born:’ The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
621, 639-40 (1990); Cary Ichter, ‘Beyond Judicial Scrutiny’: Military Compliance with NEPA,
18 GA. L. REV. 639, 645 (1984).
23. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1978).
24. Id.
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already made.”25  An EIS is intended to be a tool used to assist agencies in 
making informed decisions about whether and how to engage in their 
proposed actions.  The EIS cannot fulfill this purpose if agencies do not 
complete it before taking action.26   
In addition to forcing agencies to consider environmental impacts, the 
EIS also serves as an important mechanism for informing the public.  As the 
Supreme Court noted, NEPA “[s]ection 102(2)(C) thus serves twin aims.  The 
first is to inject environmental considerations into the federal agency’s 
decision-making process by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS.  The 
second aim is to inform the public that the agency has considered 
environmental concerns in its decision-making process.”27  When an agency 
prepares an EIS, the information within the EIS is disclosed to the public.28  
This disclosure alerts the public to the agency’s considerations and is an 
important check on agency decision-making in regard to the proposed 
action.  Once the public is informed as to the likelihood that an agency’s 
action will significantly impact the environment, it can ask questions, form 
opinions, and challenge the action that the agency ultimately decides to 
take after considering the information brought to light by the EIS.29  In the 
absence of such a mechanism, an agency could keep important information 
to itself, inviting potential wrongdoing.  If an agency was not required to 
disclose the impacts, it might be more apt to engage in action regardless of 
those impacts because nobody would know enough to be able to challenge 
the action.30   
This demonstrates a third purpose of NEPA’s EIS requirement: the 
creation of a record which courts can review when determining challenges 
for noncompliance with NEPA.  “The task of the reviewing court is to apply 
the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency 
decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court.”31  
In reviewing the whole record in response to a challenge to an agency 
action, the court must “engage in a substantial inquiry”32 as to the agency’s 
reasons for making its decision.  A court must look at the contents of the EIS 
to determine “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 
25. Id.
26. See London, supra note 17.
27. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981) (discussing NEPA section 102(2)(C),  42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).  
28. Id.
29. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1978); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (1978).
30. For more on NEPA’s public education function see French, supra note 22, at
947-48.  See also Ichter, supra note 22, at 645-46.
31. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985).
32. Citizens to Improve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
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relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”33  
Without an EIS, a court could not see what the agency based its decision 
upon and therefore would not have the information necessary to make an 
informed ruling on a NEPA noncompliance challenge.   
III. The Courts’ Review of Cases
NEPA noncompliance cases are typically brought by groups seeking to
enjoin agencies from engaging in activities before complying with NEPA.  To 
obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must establish four things: that the claim is 
likely to succeed on the merits; that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of an injunction; that the balance of equities tips in its favor; 
and that an injunction is in the public interest.34  When seeking to enjoin the 
actions of Executive Branch agencies on grounds of noncompliance with 
NEPA, environmental groups often argue that the potential harm to the 
environment that comes as a consequence of noncompliance outweighs the 
potential harm to national security that comes with compliance; the 
agencies argue just the opposite.  Therefore, in determining whether to 
grant relief in such cases, the courts have a duty to weigh the potential harm 
to the environment against the potential harm to national security. 
However, as the following cases demonstrate, courts rarely engage in this 
balancing and instead defer to the agencies’ national security assertions.35 
A. Cases in Which Courts Deferred to the Assertion of
National Security Rather Than Engaging in the
Appropriate Balancing
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, after preparing an EA the 
U.S. Navy determined that an EIS was not warranted.36  The Navy proposed 
to use mid-frequency active (“MFA”) sonar in the waters off the coast of 
33. Id.
34. Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-
90 (2008); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)).   
35. For more on the deference to national security concerns by courts, see
Joel R. Reynolds et al., No Whale of a Tale: Legal Implications of Winter v. NRDC, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 753, 765 (2009); William Krueger, In the Navy: The Future Strength of 
Preliminary Injunctions under NEPA in Light of NRDC v. Winter, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 423, 
427, 444-45 (2009); Julie G. Yap, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Stewardship 
out of the Riptide of National Security, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1289, 1299 (2004); Robert M. 
Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) (discussing national 
security fact deference).   
36. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372.
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southern California for training purposes.37  At least 37 species of marine 
mammals inhabit the area and the parties disputed the amount of harm that 
the use of sonar would cause to these mammals.38  The Navy argued that 
MFA sonar could cause temporary hearing loss and brief disruptions of the 
mammals’ behavioral patterns.  The Natural Resources Defense Council 
(“NRDC”) argued that MFA sonar could cause permanent hearing loss, 
decompression sickness, and major behavioral disruptions, and has led to 
several mass strandings of marine mammals.39  The Navy’s EA, issued in 
February 2007, determined that its training would cause eight level A 
harassments, which would cause potential destruction or loss of biological 
tissue, and 274 level B harassments, which would cause temporary injury or 
disruption of behavioral patterns.  As a precaution, the EA classified the 
latter as level A harassments as well.  From this data, the Navy determined 
that its training would not have a significant impact on the environment, 
and decided not to prepare an EIS.40   
The NRDC brought suit seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 
Navy from engaging in its training without first preparing an EIS.41  The 
District Court granted the preliminary injunction and prohibited the Navy 
from using MFA sonar in its training.42  Upon the Navy’s emergency appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit agreed that injunctive relief was appropriate, but 
remanded the case to the District Court with an order to narrow the 
injunction by providing mitigation conditions under which the Navy could 
conduct its training.43  On remand, the District Court issued a new injunction 
with six mitigation measures, and the Navy challenged two of these on 
appeal: “(5) shutting down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted 
within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6) powering down MFA sonar by 6 dB 
[decibels] during significant surface ducting conditions . . . .”44  The President 
then granted the Navy an exemption from the Coastal Zone Management 
Act (“CZMA”)45 under 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) and the Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) authorized the Navy to implement 
37. Id. at 370.  Sonar is used in the detection and tracking of enemy
submarines.   





43. Id. at 373.
44. Id.
45. The CZMA serves to “preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to
restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation’s coastal zone for this and 
succeeding generations.”  16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (1972).   
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“alternative arrangements” to NEPA compliance due to “emergency 
circumstances.”46  The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that the District 
Court’s preliminary injunction, including the six mitigation measures, was 
proper and questioned the lawfulness of the CEQ’s interpretation of the 
“emergency circumstances” regulation.47 
However, the United States Supreme Court in a split decision reversed 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and vacated the injunction.48  It held that any 
irreparable injury caused by the Navy’s training was “outweighed by the 
public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its 
sailors.”49  It agreed with the Navy’s assertions that realistic training could 
not be accomplished under the two mitigation measures at issue and that it 
was important for the Navy, and for the Nation, for the Navy to be able to 
conduct its training under realistic conditions.50  Using the President’s 
statement that training with active sonar is “essential to national security” to 
support its decision, the Court reasoned that “the balance of equities and 
consideration of the overall public interest in this case tip strongly in favor 
of the Navy,”51 in vacating the injunction and allowing the Navy’s operations 
to proceed.  
The Court, however, failed to analyze the possible harm to the 
environment from the Navy’s actions.  Instead the Court flatly concluded 
that “any” injury is outweighed by the Nation’s interest in the Navy 
protecting national security, without considering the injuries that could 
occur from the Navy’s actions or the consequences of those injuries.  This 
raises the question whether, by mere invocation of “national security 
concerns,” a defense agency will be able to override potential environmental 
injuries and avoid NEPA compliance in all cases.  The Supreme Court in 
Winter stated: “[o]f course, military interests do not always trump other 
considerations, and we have not held that they do.  In this case, however, 
the proper determination of where the public interest lies does not strike us 
46. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373.  However, an exemption to the CZMA does not
affect an agency’s duties under NEPA.  Because these are two separate statutes with 
different purposes, an agency must comply with NEPA regardless of its duties, or lack 
thereof, under the CZMA.  Furthermore, CEQ’s ability to authorize “alternative 
arrangements” due to “emergency circumstances,” is disputed by some members of 
the Court, as the U.S. Supreme Court has “never suggested that CEQ could eliminate 
[NEPA’s] command.”  Id. at 391 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
47. Id. at 374.
48. Id. at 382.
49. Id. at 376.
50. Id. at 377.
51. Id. at 378.
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as a close question.”52  However, the Court did not explain why the proper 
determination of where the public interest lies was not a close question, and 
it failed to include a discussion of when military interests will not trump 
environmental concerns.  Instead of considering the issues in detail, the 
Court simply declared that this was not a close question and deferred to the 
Navy’s assertion of national security concerns.  It seems, then, that the 
national security argument is a surefire way to circumvent the requirements 
of NEPA.53   
Such circumventions, accomplished by agencies and ratified by 
deferential courts that fail to properly weigh the competing harms, allow 
agencies to take action without completing the NEPA process.  For example, 
in Winter, the U.S. Navy failed to draft an EIS before engaging in its training. 
Had it prepared an EIS prior to taking action, however, it might have 
considered the two mitigation measures it disputed in the injunction 
ordered by the district court.  But without an EIS, how could the Navy have 
known that implementing such measures was not the proper thing to do? 
As Justice Breyer pointed out in his opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, “[t]he absence of an injunction thereby threatens to cause 
the very environmental harm that a full preaction EIS might have led the 
Navy to avoid (say, by adopting the two additional mitigation measures that 
the NRDC propose[d]).”54  Without the injunction, the Navy was free to 
engage in the training with no restrictions, without considering any 
alternatives or mitigation measures.  If it was at least required to draft an 
EIS first, it might have found that the mitigation measures ordered by the 
injunction were acceptable.  In fact, the Navy accepted four of the six 
mitigation measures in the district court’s injunction, four measures that it 
would not have adopted if the injunction had not brought them to light. 
Without the EIS, though, we do not know the harm avoided by the adoption 
of these four, nor the harm caused by the refusal to adopt the two disputed 
measures.  Justice Breyer remarked:  
[I]t would seem important to have before us at least some
estimate of the harm likely avoided by the Navy’s decision not to
contest here four of the six mitigating conditions that the District Court
ordered.  Without such evidence, it is difficult to assess the
relevant harm - that is, the environmental harm likely caused by
52. Id.
53. See Milne, supra note 22, at 198; Brian Schierding, A Whale of a Tale: the
Supreme Court Sets a New Trend Favoring National Security over Environmental Concerns, 16 
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 751, 769 (2009); Lisa Lightbody, Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 593, 605-06 (2009). 
54. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 383 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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the Navy’s exercises with the four uncontested mitigation 
measures (but without the two contested mitigation measures) 
in place.55   
If the Navy had informed itself of the environmental harms ahead of 
time by preparing an EIS, it could have used the information to assess the 
advantages and disadvantages of implementing the mitigation measures 
and could have thereby made an informed decision on whether to adopt 
them.56   
In fact, the Navy announced its intent to prepare an EIS in December 
of 2006.57  It began the EIS process, stating that it would be complete in 
January of 2009.58  However, it began its training exercises in February of 
2007.59  The Navy prepared an EA, which it concluded with a FONSI on 
February 12, 2007.  Training exercises began that same day.60  As explained 
above, an EA is used to determine whether an EIS should be prepared.61  
Here the Navy had already decided to prepare an EIS and had already begun 
the EIS process before it prepared the EA.62  The preparation of the EA and 
the FONSI, then, appear to be an attempt to get around the EIS timing 
requirements.  By preparing the EA and issuing the FONSI, the Navy could 
begin its training program before preparing the EIS.  If there would truly be 
no significant impact as the Navy claimed after its EA, however, there should 
have been no reason to continue the EIS process; when a FONSI is issued at 
the conclusion of the EA, it means no EIS is warranted.  In fact, the Navy did 
not challenge the lower court’s decision that an EIS was required for its 
training exercise in southern California.63  Instead, it argued that it should 
have been able to prepare the EIS after beginning its training because of 
CEQ’s authorization of “alternative arrangements” to NEPA due to 
“emergency circumstances.”64  It sought this authorization to overcome the 
55. Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
56. For more on Justice Breyer’s opinion in Winter, see Kendall, supra note 22,
at 11116-17.  
57. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 387-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 388 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1978).
62. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 388 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  CEQ’s ability to authorize “alternative
arrangements” because of “emergency circumstances,” however, is questionable.  Id. 
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lower courts’ rulings.65  But preparing an EIS after beginning an action 
defeats the purpose of NEPA.  As the dissent in Winter noted, “Had the Navy 
prepared a legally sufficient EIS before beginning the SOCAL exercises, 
NEPA would have functioned as its drafters intended: the EIS process and 
associated public input might have convinced the Navy voluntarily to adopt 
mitigation measures, but NEPA itself would not have impeded the Navy’s 
exercises.”66  In other words, if the Navy prepared an EIS before engaging in 
its training exercises, it would have considered mitigation measures and 
alternatives to its action and may have implemented some of these 
measures.  Although NEPA would not require the implementation of such 
measures, its purpose is to force agencies to consider them.  The Navy 
thwarted this purpose by not preparing an EIS and therefore not considering 
any alternatives or mitigation measures before taking action.   
The U.S. Supreme Court permitted the Navy to thwart NEPA when it 
vacated the injunction against the Navy without properly weighing the 
competing interests.67  By deferring to the Navy’s assertion of national 
security concerns instead of conducting the appropriate balancing between 
those considerations and environmental concerns, the Court in effect 
created a national security exemption to NEPA.  It allowed the Navy to avoid 
NEPA simply because the Navy invoked “national security,” without 
exploring the real threat posed to national security if the Navy were required 
to prepare an EIS before beginning its training.  The Court did this despite 
the lack of a national security exemption under NEPA.   
Similarly, in State of Wisconsin v. Weinberger, the Seventh Circuit held that, 
even if there had been a NEPA violation, an injunction was not warranted, 
and the Navy did not have to prepare a supplemental EIS, because of the 
importance of national security.68  The court stated that “[a]lthough there is 
no national defense exception to NEPA, and the Navy does not claim one, 
the national well-being and security as determined by the Congress and the 
President demand consideration before an injunction should issue for a 
NEPA violation.”69  While the court was correct in stating that national 
at 373 (majority opinion).  The U.S. Supreme Court has “never suggested that CEQ 
could eliminate [NEPA’s] command.”  Id. at 391 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
65. Id. at 389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
67. “In denying the plaintiffs’ injunction on the basis of national security
concerns, without considering the plaintiffs’ substantive claim, the Court evaded its 
own responsibility.”  Susan Lee, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: The U.S. 
Supreme Court Vacates a Preliminary Injunction that Imposed Mitigation Measures on Naval 
Defense Training, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 187, 192 (2009).   
68. Wis. v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 425 (7th Cir. 1984).
69. Id.
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 2011 
15 
security must be considered before an injunction is issued, it failed to 
recognize that this interest must be balanced against that of the 
environment.  The Navy had constructed an extremely low frequency (“ELF”) 
submarine communications test facility in northern Wisconsin in 1969.70  
The facility was deactivated in 1978, but operations resumed in 1981.71  The 
public’s concern was the possible effect of continuously exposing humans, 
animals, and plants to extremely low frequency electromagnetic radiation.72  
When the Navy reactivated the facility in 1981, it did not prepare a 
supplemental EIS.73   
The court deferred to the Navy’s expertise in making its decision on 
whether to require the preparation of a supplemental EIS, noting that “[t]he 
Navy has emphasized that an ELF submarine communications system is of 
the highest priority for national defense.”74  “The Secretary of the Navy also 
stated . . . that it is essential to the national defense and that any delay in its 
construction is contrary to national defense interests.”75  Relying on these 
statements, the court held that the delay that would be caused by 
compliance with NEPA outweighed the benefit of preparing a supplemental 
EIS.76  The court simply deferred to the Navy’s judgment without considering 
its motives.  As Judge Cudahy, concurring in part, dissenting in part, pointed 
out, “the majority’s discussion of the evidence in the case treats as 
authoritative any statements made by the Navy’s experts.”77  The court did 
not balance the national security claims against the environmental 
concerns, and it never considered the fact that the Navy could be biased.78  
The court did not engage in a determination of whether there was an 
emergency that warranted an exception to NEPA compliance because of the 
delay it might cause.  Furthermore, it did not explain why any delay caused 
by the preparation of an EIS would not have been harmless since the facility 
had already been closed for years.  Instead of questioning whether national 
security would actually be affected, and instead of weighing the potential 
harm to national security against the potential harm to humans and the 
environment caused by exposure to radiation, the Seventh Circuit held that, 
70. Id. at 414-15.
71. Id. at 415.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 427.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 428 (“[T]he delay occasioned by the issuance of an injunction could
bring about serious consequences for our national defense.”).   
77. Id. at 428-29 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
78. For a discussion on judges’ deference to factual judgments made by the
executive branch in litigation involving national security, see Chesney, supra note 35.   
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even if there was a NEPA violation, the Navy did not have to prepare an EIS 
because of the importance of national security concerns.79 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in National 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Pena, also deferred to the assertion of national 
security in its determination of whether an Executive Branch agency had to 
comply with NEPA, even when there was no ongoing emergency.80  The 
proposed action was the construction of numerous sites for a nuclear 
weapons stockpile stewardship and management (“SSM”) program by the 
Department of Energy (“DOE”).81  The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the 
defendants from going further until they prepared an adequate EIS.82  While 
the court agreed that more public disclosure was necessary, it refused to 
interfere with the project’s construction.  The Court stated that it was “not 
entirely satisfied with the disclosure that surrounds these programs,” and 
requested “that the DOE perform a fuller disclosure of the environmental, 
health and safety risks.”  It further mandated that “[s]uch disclosure should 
be responsive to Plaintiffs’ concerns, but need not hold up the 
implementation of either program.”83   
In making its decision, the court deferred to DOE’s judgment that any 
delay would be harmful to national security, relying on defendants’ 
contention “that any delay in the SSM Program could have serious national 
security implications.  Secretary Peña stated that any delay in the SSM 
Program ‘may cause other countries to doubt or question the credibility of 
our Nation’s nuclear deterrent.’”84  The court simply went along with the 
agency’s invocation of national security implications without exploring the 
truth of it.  With an injunction at issue, the court claimed that it was 
balancing the environmental harms with the interest in national security. 
But then it flatly concluded that national security took precedence, stating 
that the “national security interest here must be paramount.”85  While the 
court purported to rationalize its decision, “[a]ny doubt over the credibility 
of our nuclear deterrent would create unacceptable risks in the event of a 
future crisis akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis,”86 it admitted that there was no 
current crisis.  “While the probability that such future crises might come to 
79. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 428.
80. National Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Pena, 972 F. Supp. 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1997)
(“This Court is reluctant to override national security judgments on the viability of 
our nuclear program made by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense.”).    
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 19.
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pass is not as great today as in the past, we must never ignore such a 
possibility.  Although the sun shines today, dark and ominous clouds can 
emerge without much warning.”87  
While national security is important, when there is an injunction at 
issue, a court must balance the competing interests and give careful 
consideration to each side.  If there is no current crisis threatening national 
security, courts should look at the assertion of national security more 
skeptically when it is used as a way to avoid compliance with NEPA; in such 
situations, environmental concerns could very well outweigh national 
security concerns.  There is no reason that the DOE could not have prepared 
an adequate EIS before engaging in the proposed action in National Resources 
Defense Council, Inc v. Pena.  The low probability of a future crisis should not 
justify the failure to prepare an adequate EIS before taking action today, 
especially when the current environmental concerns are immense.  The 
court recognized the environmental concerns, noting that “there have been 
enough accidents involving nuclear programs to make Plaintiffs’ concerns 
over the environmental, health and safety issues in this case real.”88  In fact, 
the impacts of programs like the one proposed in National Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Pena have been horrific.  “American citizens may have been 
exposed to excessive amounts of radiation in the nuclear tests of the 1950’s. 
Environmentalists suggest that this could be responsible for cancers in as 
many as 75,000 people who were inadvertently exposed.”89  But even while 
acknowledging the extent of the environmental impacts that such programs 
could have, the court would not allow its deference to national security to 
waiver.  A potential future threat to national security, even if unlikely, 
apparently outweighed the present possibility of great harm to the 
environment, public health, and safety. 
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia agreed with this notion 
in Commission for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, where it deferred to the 
assertion of national security “despite the real potential for significant harm 
to the environment.”90  In Commission for Nuclear Responsibility, the plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin an underground nuclear explosion, arguing that the Atomic 
Energy Commission failed to fully comply with NEPA.91  Even though there 
was a question about the legality of the test, the court held that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction enjoining the test.92  Again, with 
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 20-21.
90. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing
Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
91. Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, 463 F.2d at 797.
92. Id.
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an injunction at issue, the court had the responsibility to balance the 
competing interests.  And again, in deciding which was in the public 
interest-protecting the environment or protecting national security, the 
court gave primacy to asserted national security interests and denied the 
injunction.93  Despite the potential of great harm to the environment and the 
lack of a national security exception under NEPA, the court ruled that the 
agency did not have to fully comply with NEPA merely because it made 
“assertions of harm to national security and foreign policy.”94  Assertions of 
harm to national security again apparently outweighed the real potential for 
significant environmental harm and allowed the government to avoid 
NEPA’s EIS requirements.95   
Likewise, in Smith v. Schlesinger, the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California also held that national security was a reason 
not to require the preparation of an EIS under NEPA, merely because the 
Navy was involved.  The court held that “[t]o grant the requested injunctive 
relief following such unreasonable delay would, under the facts of this case, 
severely prejudice the Navy, its personnel, and most importantly, the 
national defense.”96  Again, instead of engaging in the appropriate balancing 
required in deciding a case involving injunctive relief, the court focused on 
the harm to national security without weighing it against the harm to the 
environment.  The plaintiffs sought an injunction on the Navy’s project 
involving the transfer of armed forces from the Long Beach Naval Facility to 
other ports until an EIS was prepared.97  Although the main reason that the 
court ruled against the plaintiffs was the fact that they brought their action 
long after the project had begun, the court did not state why the national 
defense would be prejudiced if the preparation of an EIS was required, 
except that the project at issue involved the Navy and national defense.98  It 
does not follow merely from the fact that a project involves national security 
that environmental concerns are insignificant and that the preparation of an 
EIS will harm national security.  If this were the case, Congress would have 
created a national security exception under NEPA, whereby defense 
agencies would not have to prepare an EIS before engaging in action in 
furtherance of national security.   
Lastly, in National Audubon Society v. Department of Navy, even though the 
Fourth Circuit held that the Navy failed to comply with NEPA’s 
requirements, it determined that a narrower injunction than that imposed 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 798.
95. See Ichter, supra note 22, at 650-52.
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by the District Court was warranted.99  The U.S. Navy proposed to construct 
an aircraft landing field within five miles of a National Wildlife Refuge.100  
The court held that, although the Navy failed to take a hard look at the 
environmental effects of its proposed action, thereby violating NEPA, it 
would not be prevented from engaging in its proposed activities while it 
prepared a supplemental EIS.101  The court reasoned that, in national 
security matters, deference will be given to the Executive Branch, holding 
that “[d]istrict courts should not substitute their own judgments for those of 
the Executive Branch in such national security matters as pilot training, 
squadron readiness, and safety.”102  While it is true that courts should defer 
to the executive agencies’ judgments in their areas of expertise, it is not 
within courts’ authority to exempt such agencies from complying with NEPA 
because there is no national security exemption under NEPA.   
A court can, after deciding that an agency took a “hard look” at the 
consequences of its actions and properly determined that there was no 
significant environmental impact, defer to the agency’s decision not to 
prepare an EIS, but it cannot allow the agency to avoid complying with 
NEPA altogether by failing to even take the requisite “hard look.”  By 
allowing the Navy to avoid NEPA, the National Audubon Society court 
effectively created a national security exemption that is not otherwise 
present under NEPA.  Because an injunction was at issue, the court had a 
duty to balance the competing harms; it should not have been able to 
simply defer to the Navy because national security was at issue.  Instead, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded, without conducting the appropriate balancing, 
that because the activities at issue would not cause environmental harm, 
they should have been permitted while the Navy prepared a supplemental 
EIS.103  But because the EIS is the tool used to determine what the 
environmental effects of a project are, it is unclear how the court could have 
concluded without an EIS that the actions were not harmful to the 
environment, especially if the court was not substituting its own judgment 
for that of the Navy.   
B. Cases in Which Courts Engaged in the Appropriate
Balancing Rather Than Deferring to the Assertion of
National Security
In National Audubon Society, the Fourth Circuit arguably erred in 
overturning the district court’s decision.  The district court engaged in the 
99. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 422 F.3d at 204.
100. Id. at 181.
101. Id. at 207.
102. Id. at 203.
103. Id. at 207.
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 2011 
20 
appropriate balancing and its decision should have been affirmed.  Rather 
than deferring to the Navy’s assertion of national security, the district court 
considered the competing harm to the environment, finding that “[w]ithout 
an injunction, . . . additional landowners will be permanently displaced, tax 
revenue permanently lost, and the fragile habitat around [the site] will be 
disrupted.  This irreparable harm will occur despite the fact that a proper EIS 
has never been completed.”104  The court weighed this harm against the 
harm to the Navy and national security, concluding that “[t]he harm to the 
Navy will not be appreciable if its development . . . is enjoined until a proper 
NEPA assessment is completed, but without an injunction, [p]laintiffs and 
the public will be irreparably harmed.”105  After properly weighing the 
competing harms, the court concluded that an injunction was warranted, 
finding that “[a]bsent an injunction, the Navy will be permitted to undertake 
substantial and irreversible changes affecting the fragile wildlife refuges of 
the Pungo Unit and Pocosin Lakes without first thoroughly considering the 
consequences of its actions.”106  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit ignored these 
environmental impacts when it narrowed the injunction, reasoning that the 
Navy’s action posed no environmental harm.107  The Fourth Circuit allowed 
the Navy to circumvent NEPA by ruling that, even though the Navy had 
violated NEPA, it could continue its activities while it prepared a 
supplemental EIS.108  As previously discussed, this was not within the court’s 
authority.  The district court, on the other hand, conducted the appropriate 
balancing test and recognized that the Navy had to be enjoined from 
engaging in its proposed activity before preparing a supplemental EIS.  If the 
district court had not granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs in National 
Audubon Society, it would have permitted the Navy to take action before 
considering the impacts of its activities, mitigation measures, and 
alternatives, defeating the purposes of NEPA.  However, the district court 
stayed within the bounds of its authority as it properly weighed the 
competing harms and refrained from creating a national security exemption 
to NEPA for the Navy.   
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii also engaged 
in the appropriate balancing in Makua v. Rumsfeld, as it weighed the public 
interest in national security against the public interest in the environment. 
The court recognized “that the public has a substantial interest in the 
national well-being and security of the nation . . . [but] the public also has a 
104. Wash. County, N.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 357 F. Supp. 2d 861, 877-78
(E.D.N.C. 2005).  
105. Id. at 878.
106. Id.
107. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 422 F.3d at 207.
108. Id.
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significant interest in the protection of endangered species, cultural 
resources, . . . and the environment.”109  In Makua, the plaintiff, an 
environmental group, sought to compel the defendant, the U.S. Army, to 
prepare an EIS addressing the effects of military training with live 
ammunition at the Makua Military Reservation.110  The Army completed an 
EA resulting in a FONSI, meaning that the Army had no intention of 
preparing an EIS.111  Rather than deferring to the Army, the court conducted 
the proper analysis to ensure that the Army had at least taken the requisite 
“hard look” under NEPA and to determine whether the requirements for an 
injunction were met.112  It ultimately decided that, “because the balance of 
hardships tips decidedly in favor of Malama Makua,” a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the Army’s training pending final disposition on the 
merits of the case was warranted.113  The court reasoned that the Army did 
not demonstrate that significant harm would result from the imposition of a 
preliminary injunction.114  On the other hand, there was evidence that, in the 
absence of an injunction, significant environmental harm could have 
resulted.115  
Further, the Army, in its EA, failed to take the requisite “hard look.”116  
The EA lacked evidence as to the extent of the environmental harm which 
would occur as a result of its actions.  “Although the Army states that there 
is some risk from wildfires, the [supplemental environmental assessment] 
fails to specify and quantify that risk for the public.”117  The court determined 
that there was no way that the Army could have concluded its EA with a 
FONSI when it did not examine in detail the possible environmental impacts 
of its actions, noting that “[t]his lack of data undermines the reliability of the 
[supplemental environmental assessment].  It is unlikely that an agency can 
determine whether a proposed action would have no significant impact on 
the environment when the agency does not even examine or quantify the 
potential for adverse environmental effects.”118  The Army’s EA had not 
actually found that its activities would not have had a significant 
environmental impact, despite claims that it had done so, and the court 
109. Makua, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
110. Id. at 1204.
111. Id. at 1206.
112. Id. at 1216, 1220-22.
113. Id. at 1204, 1222.
114. Id. at 1222.
115. Id. at 1221.
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would not tolerate this.119  Again, although NEPA does not require a 
substantive result from agencies, it is not a nullity; it requires agencies to 
conduct meaningful assessments of their activities and the environmental 
effects of those activities.  The Makua court held that no meaningful 
assessment was conducted, finding “general statements about ‘possible 
effects’ and ‘some risk’ do not constitute a ‘hard look’ absent a justification 
regarding why more definitive information could not be provided.”120  
Although courts will defer to an agency’s judgment on what to do with the 
results obtained after compliance with NEPA, they cannot defer to an 
agency’s decision not to fully and properly comply with NEPA by failing, for 
example, to take the requisite “hard look,” as the Army did in Makua.  The 
Makua court, however, would not allow the Army to circumvent NEPA with 
an empty assertion of national security.   
The court was able to bar the Army from engaging in its training 
activities without first complying with NEPA by conducting the appropriate 
balancing.  Because the Army did not provide an adequate assessment of 
the environmental harms that its activities would cause, did not refute the 
possible environmental harms, which included the extinction of endangered 
species, the loss of cultural resources, the denial of Native Hawaiian rights, 
and adverse effects on the environment, and did not present sufficient 
evidence regarding the harm that an injunction would cause it, the court 
could not hold that the balance of equities tipped in the Army’s favor.121  
Furthermore, as the court pointed out, there were alternative sites where the 
Army could have conducted its training.122  Even if these sites were more 
expensive, “financial harm is ‘not the sort of “unusual circumstance” that 
justifies a court’s refusal to enjoin NEPA violations.’”123  Accordingly, the 
court found that the balance of equities tipped in favor of the plaintiff and 
granted the preliminary injunction to compel the Army to prepare an 
adequate EIS before engaging in its proposed activity.124   
The following discussion includes three cases that do not involve 
NEPA.  The cases, however, are important examples of courts using the 
proper balancing in determining whether to grant injunctive relief.  For 
instance, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is another case in which the 
Court properly weighed the competing interests rather than simply deferring 
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project, 161 F.3d at 1213 (internal
quotations omitted)). 
121. Makua, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1139 (D. Haw.
2000)).  
124. Makua, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
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to the Executive’s assertion of national security.125  In Youngstown, the 
President issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of and operate most of the nation’s steel mills.126  The owners of 
the steel mills brought suit, seeking injunctive relief to restrain the 
enforcement of the orders.127  The United States argued that it had the power 
to issue such orders to protect the well-being and safety of the nation.128  
Instead of deferring to national security assertions, the U.S. Supreme Court 
balanced the harms that would occur to national security if an injunction 
prohibiting seizure were granted against those harms that would occur to 
mill owners in the absence of such an injunction.129  The Court noted that 
“seizure and governmental operation of these going businesses were bound 
to result in many present and future damages of such nature as to be 
difficult, if not incapable, of measurement.”130  The Court also took into 
account the fact that the Legislature had already considered allowing for 
governmental seizure in times of emergency and decided against it because 
it was thought to interfere with collective bargaining.131   
In addition, the Court considered the President’s authority to issue 
such orders, noting that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order 
must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”132  
The Court found no such authority to exist as “[t]here is no statute that 
expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did 
here.  Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been 
directed from which such a power can fairly be implied.”133  Even as 
Commander in Chief, the Court found that the President lacked authority to 
give the order of seizure because “we cannot with faithfulness to our 
constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property 
in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.”134  The Executive 
does not have the power to make laws because “[t]his is a job for the 
Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.”135  The Executive cannot 
125. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
126. Id. at 582.
127. Id. at 583.
128. Id. at 583-84.
129. Id. at 585.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 586.
132. Id. at 585.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 587.
135. Id.
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 2011 
24 
simply claim “national security” and then do whatever it pleases, especially 
when the Legislature has already considered and rejected a law that would 
permit the action that the Executive is proposing to take.  The Legislative 
Branch, not the Executive, has the power to make laws and the Executive 
must abide by such laws.136   
Furthermore, it is the Court’s responsibility to ensure that the 
Executive is abiding by such laws, rather than creating its own.  To do so, the 
Court must review the actions of agencies when challenged rather than 
simply defer to the judgments of such agencies, even in times of war.  If the 
Court fails to do so, there is no check on the Executive’s power; the 
Executive is free to disregard the limits that Congress has placed on it.137  In 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court properly refused to allow the 
Executive to ignore the limits on its power.138  The Court held that “[w]hether 
or not the President has independent power, absent congressional 
authorization, . . . he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in 
proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”139  The 
Executive cannot use war as a justification for any and all action it desires to 
take.  The Executive has certain powers while Congress has certain others, 
with a strict separation between the powers of each, as “‘[t]he power to make 
the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President. . . . 
But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the 
proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the 
President.’”140  Each branch of government must stay within the bounds of its 
power and must not usurp the powers of the other branches.  If the 
Executive is allowed to do whatever it pleases in times of war, the notion of 
separation of powers, upon which this nation was founded, is destroyed.141  
In Hamdan, the Court would not allow this.  At issue was the Executive’s use 
of a military commission to try Hamdan, a Yemeni national captured by 
136. For a further discussion on Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. and the
paradigms it provides for interpreting the Constitution’s allocation of power between 
Congress and the Executive during times of war, see generally Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215 (2002).   
137. For a discussion on the courts’ reluctance to curb the military and the
possible future effects this reluctance will have in light of new exemptions for the 
military under various environmental laws, see Hope Babcock, National Security and 
Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 147-48 (2007).   
138. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006).
139. Id. at 734 n. 23.
140. Id. at 591-92 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866)).
141. See Marcilynn A. Burke, Green Peace? Protecting Our National Treasures While
Providing for Our National Security, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 803, 874-75 
(2008).   
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militia forces in Afghanistan and then turned over to the U.S., for then-
unspecified crimes, later designated as conspiracy “to commit . . . offenses 
triable by military commission.”142  The Court found that no congressional 
act authorized the Executive to convene a military commission to try 
Hamdan, and “[a]bsent a more specific congressional authorization, the task 
of this Court is . . . to decide whether Hamdan’s military commission is so 
justified.”143  If the Executive’s power to take action is not specifically 
authorized by Congress, the Court has a duty to examine the action to see if 
it is justified.  If the Court instead simply defers, it allows the Executive too 
much authority, authority in excess of what was intended for it.  In the 
absence of congressional authorization, the Executive must show that the 
act is necessary in order for the Court to permit it; the Executive failed to do 
so in Hamdan.144  Because there was no congressional authorization for the 
Executive’s action establishing a military commission and because the 
Executive failed to show necessity, the Court would not permit the action. 
The Court refused to simply defer to the Executive’s judgment merely 
because it was during a time of war.  Instead, the Court conducted the 
proper analysis and concluded that the Executive was overstepping its 
bounds; the fact that it was a time of war did not authorize the Executive to 
exceed its authority.145   
The U.S. Supreme Court also refused to defer to the Executive in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, where it made clear its role in reviewing challenges.146  The Court
declared that it will give weight to the Executive’s judgments during times of
war, stating that “we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the
judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual
prosecution of a war . . . .”147  However, it explained that this does not mean
that it will simply defer to the Executive.148  Instead, it will review the
Executive’s actions.  As the Court noted, “it does not infringe on the core
role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and
142. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566.
143. Id. at 594-95.
144. Id. at 612 (“The charge’s shortcomings . . . indicat[e] [t]here is a broader
inability on the Executive’s part here to satisfy the most basic precondition - at least 
in the absence of specific congressional authorization - for establishment of military 
commissions: military necessity.”).   
145. See Babcock, supra note 137, at 153 (arguing that we should doubt the
genuineness of the armed forces’ claims that environmental laws are encroaching on 
their military efforts when there is evidence that such claims are mere excuses to 
avoid compliance with the laws).   
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constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those 
presented here.”149   
The Court reviewed the Executive’s decision to detain Hamdi, an 
American citizen classified as an “enemy combatant,” indefinitely during the 
war with Afghanistan, without allowing him to challenge the basis for his 
detention.150  The Court stated that “the threats to military operations posed 
by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a 
citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to 
be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”151  In other words, the Court held that 
it would not refrain from reviewing the Executive’s action merely because 
the Executive claimed that doing so would be a threat to its military 
operations; the threat to such operations does not trump a citizen’s right to 
review.  The Court stressed the importance of the doctrine of separation of 
powers and declared that “[w]e have long since made clear that a state of 
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nation’s citizens.”152  A state of war does not mean that the Executive can do 
whatever it pleases.  And if it tries to do so, judicial review is the mechanism 
to stop it as “the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to 
play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, 
serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the 
realm of detentions.”153  If the Court defers to the Executive’s decisions 
rather than engaging in the appropriate review, it allows the Executive’s 
power to go unchecked, permitting the Executive to take actions that are not 
authorized by the Legislature.  It is up to the Court to ensure that the 
Executive Branch is not creating its own laws, but rather is abiding by the 
laws as created by the Legislative Branch.   
IV. Congress Did Not Intend to Add a National Security
Exemption to NEPA
The Legislative Branch did not include a national security exemption
under NEPA.154  It did, on the other hand, create exemptions for national 
security under other environmental laws, including the Clean Air Act,155 the 
149. Id.
150. Id. at 509.
151. Id. at 535.
152. Id. at 536. (citation omitted).
153. Id.  For a further discussion on the government’s attempts to persuade
the courts to defer to its judgment and the courts’ opinions in Hamdi, including the 
differing views of the various Justices, see Chesney, supra note 35, at 1367-71.   
154. See Babcock, supra note 137, at 110.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (1990).
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Clean Water Act,156 the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),157 the 
Endangered Species Act,158 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(“MMPA”).159  Therefore, if Congress intended a national security exemption 
to NEPA, it would have included it in the statute as it did with all of the 
other environmental statutes.  Because the scope of NEPA is broad, it may 
overlap with these other statutes at times, as it did in Winter, where the 
MMPA and the CZMA were also at issue.  However, when an agency is 
granted a national security exemption under a different statute that 
explicitly allows for it, as was the Navy in Winter, its duties under NEPA 
should not be affected.  An agency that is exempted, for example, from a 
rule that says it cannot take a marine mammal (MMPA), does not 
necessarily have to be exempted from a rule that says it must prepare an EIS 
before engaging in an activity that will result in the taking of a marine 
mammal (NEPA).  It is one thing to be allowed to take a marine mammal 
and another to have to consider the environmental impacts of taking the 
mammal before doing so.  In fact, this is the essence of NEPA: agencies 
must consider the environmental impacts of their actions before engaging in 
them, allowing them to discover and take steps to lessen the impacts if they 
so choose, but will not be required to effect any substantive result. 
Therefore, the grant of an exemption to a substantive statute, like the 
MMPA, should not affect an agency’s duty to comply with the procedural 
statute, NEPA.  The goal is that, after considering the impacts of the 
proposed action under NEPA, the agency will either decide not to take the 
action or to implement mitigation measures to lessen the environmental 
impacts of the action, even though it is permitted to take the action under 
the national security exemption to the substantive statute.   
Because Congress did not include a national security exemption under 
NEPA, the agencies of the Executive Branch must abide by it, even in times 
of war, and the courts cannot take it upon themselves to except these 
agencies from doing so.160  Instead, the courts must give effect to what 
Congress enacted.  As the Maryland Court of Appeals stated, “[w]e are 
obliged to ascertain and carry out the legislative intent; to consider the 
language of the enactment in its natural and ordinary signification; to not 
insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in 
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1368(d) (1994).
157. 16 U.S.C. §1456(c)(1)(B) (1992).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (1988).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f)(1) (2003).
160. The Executive must seek and obtain exemptions from the Legislature, not
the Court.  For a discussion of the various other environmental statutes from which 
the Executive sought and obtained exemptions from the Legislature, see Babcock, 
supra note 137, at 126-31.   
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its original form.”161  Courts cannot substitute their own opinions of what the 
law should be for what the law says; they must apply the law as it is stated. 
And, as stated, NEPA does not include a national security exemption.  If 
Congress does intend a national security exemption to exist in NEPA, it 
must write this into the statute, but until then it is not within the Court’s 
authority to create such an exemption.162  
V. Conclusion
By deferring to the agencies of the Executive Branch in determining
whether to grant injunctive relief in NEPA noncompliance cases, the Court 
ignores its duty to act as a check on the Executive’s power and instead 
grants the Executive an exemption from NEPA.  When injunctive relief is 
requested, the Court is required to give due weight to each competing harm 
and grant relief to the party toward whom equity tips.  This means that, in 
NEPA noncompliance cases where national security is asserted as a defense, 
courts must balance the harm to the environment against the harm to 
national security.  When courts ignore their duty to conduct this balancing 
and instead defer to the assertion of national security, they create a national 
security exemption to NEPA, one which the legislature did not include or 
intend.   
The agencies of the Executive Branch serve an important role and the 
preservation of national security is of extreme importance, but 
environmental impacts from the actions of these agencies can be just as 
significant; the effects of agency action on our health and safety can be just 
as damning as the absence of action on the preservation of national 
security.  Courts must not, without first examining the environmental 
effects, deny injunctive relief any time an agency claims that an injunction 
will prevent it from protecting national security.  When an agency’s proposed 
action is in the interest of national security and compliance with NEPA 
would truly cause a delay that would impede the agency’s ability to protect 
and preserve national security, an exception to NEPA compliance may be 
justified.  But a court cannot decide if this is true without first weighing the 
competing harms.  Courts must explore the truth of the national security 
161. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:3 (7th ed. 2009) (quoting Rome v. Lowenthal, 428 A.2d 75, 
79 (1981)). 
162. “[A]ll three branches of government [should] assume their respective
responsibilities for protecting the nation in its entirety.”  Burke, supra note 141, at 
875. See also Stephen Dycus, Osama’s Submarine: National Security and Environmental
Protection After 9/11, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12, 54 (2005) (discussing
the Executive’s lack of support for the exemptions it seeks under environmental
laws).
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assertion to ensure that it is not being used merely as a pretext to avoid 
complying with NEPA.   
NEPA serves as an important check on agency action.  It forces 
agencies to consider the consequences of and alternatives to their actions, 
in turn leading to substantive changes in decision-making.  NEPA’s EIS 
requirements also serve to inform the public and to create records which 
courts can review in determining challenges for noncompliance.  While the 
agencies of the Executive Branch may play a crucial role in the protection 
and preservation of our national security, this should not give them a free 
pass to escape NEPA compliance; it is important for them to consider the 
environmental impacts of their proposed actions.   
The Legislature did not intend to exempt agencies in the business of 
protecting national security from NEPA.  If it did, it would have written a 
national security exemption into the statute, just as it wrote one into other 
major environmental statutes.  If a national security exemption to NEPA is 
the Legislature’s intent, the Legislature should write it into the statute.  But 
unless and until Congress writes a national security exemption into NEPA, 
courts have a duty to conduct the appropriate balancing in determining 
whether to grant injunctive relief in NEPA noncompliance cases rather than 
merely giving it lip service in order to refrain from creating an exemption 
which Congress did not intend.   
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